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CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDS
From July 1984 through March 1985, the Eighth Circuit decided
few cases concerning civil rights attorney's fee awards under 42
U.S.C. section 1988.1 The court adopted a generous standard for
1. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90
Stat. 2641, amended by Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2633 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)). The Act states:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.
1681 et seq.], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et
seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
The Act's purpose is stated in the Senate Report which accompanied the bill:
The purpose and effect of S. 2278 are simple-it is designed to allow
courts to provide the familiar remedy of reasonable counsel fees to prevail-
ing parties in suits to enforce the civil rights acts which Congress has passed
since 1866. S. 2278 follows the language of Titles II and VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b) and 2000e-5(k), and section
402 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e).
All of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and
fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a
meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies
which these laws contain.
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must
sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If
private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who
violate the Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity,
then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to
vindicate these rights in court.
S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5909-10. For a discussion of the legislative history of this law, see
Derfner, One Giant Step: The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 441, 446-51 (1977).
The statutory provision of attorney's fees is an exception to the American rule
that fees are not ordinarily recoverable by the prevailing party. The American rule
was set out in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). In England and
most other countries, successful litigants generally recover attorney's fees. See
Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAUF. L. REV. 792,
797-98 (1966). For a history of attorney's fees recovery in the United States, see
Leubsdof, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984). To mitigate the harshness of the no-fee rule, Congress
has enacted numerous statutory fee provisions. See Research Project, Statutory Attor-
ney Fees Provisions, 4 HAMUNE L. REV. 609, 675-714 (1980) (list of federal statutes
authorizing award of attorney's fees). Additionally, the courts have used their equita-
ble powers to create exceptions to the American rule. See Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (in narrowly defined circumstances federal courts have
inherent power to assess attorney's fees against counsel); Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert,
444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (Court has consistently recognized "equitable fund" doc-
trine, which provides that lawyer who recovers common fund for benefit of others is
entitled to reasonable attorney's fees from fund as a whole); Rich Co. v. U.S. ex reL
1119
1
et al.: Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
determining whether a party was entitled to a fee award2 and dis-
cussed factors to be considered when establishing a reasonable
amount to be awarded.3 The court also discussed the relationship
between section 1988 fee awards and other federal law.4
I. PREVAILING PARTY
To recover attorney's fees under section 1988, a plaintiff must be a
prevailing party. 5 In Hensley v. Eckerhart,6 the Supreme Court
adopted a broad standard7 for determining whether a plaintiff was a
prevailing party: "[P]laintiffs may be considered 'prevailing parties'
for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in
litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in
bringing the suit."8 The Eighth Circuit applied this standard in Fast
v. School District of Ladue.9 In Fast, a tenured teacher sued the school
district, claiming that her fourteenth amendment rights had been vi-
olated by the school district's lay-off procedure.1O The teacher
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 & n.17, 130 (1974) (citing several excep-
tions to American rule); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 387-89 (1970)
(petitioners in derivative suit entitled to award of attorney's fees where expenses in-
curred were for benefit of corporation and other shareholders).
Noting the limitations of these exceptions, the federal courts in the early 1970's
created another equitable exception. This exception permitted the court to award
fees to litigants who benefited the public by successfully vindicating congressional
civil rights policies. This became the "private attorney general" exception. See New-
man v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). Though adopted by several
federal courts of appeal, including the Eighth Circuit in Fowler v. Schwarzwalder,
498 F.2d 143, 146 (8th Cir. 1974), the doctrine was ultimately rejected in Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In Alyesha the Court,
fearing that an unrestricted broadening of the private attorney general exception
would lead to the collapse of the American no fee rule, held that Congress, not the
courts, must decide under what circumstances fees are appropriate.
In quick response to the Alyeska decision, Congress enacted the Civil Rights At-
torney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Congress acknowledged
that reliance on a recovery of fees is an important factor in enabling indigent parties
to vindicate their civil rights. See S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5910.
2. See infra notes 5-43 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 65-90 and accompanying text.
5. Section 1988 provides that in actions to enforce certain federal civil rights
statutes, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee .. " 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (emphasis
added); see also supra note 1 (text of § 1988).
6. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
7. The Court stated that the standard "is a generous formulation that brings the
plaintiff only across the statutory threshold." Id. at 433.
8. Id. (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)).
9. 728 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1984).
10. Id. at 1031.
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claimed that the school district had denied her procedural due pro-
cess by refusing to give her a hearing and a statement explaining her
lay-off.I I The district court rejected her claim for reinstatement and
a pre-termination hearing.12 The district court held, however, that
the school district denied her procedural due process by refusing to
give her a post-termination hearing and a statement explaining her
lay-off.13 The school district then furnished the plaintiff with a state-
ment explaining her lay-off and set a date for a post-termination
hearing.14 The plaintiff waived the hearing and moved for nominal
damages and attorney's fees.15 The district court awarded her one
dollar in nominal damages but denied her motion for attorney's fees,
holding that she was not a prevailing party within the meaning of
section 1988.16
The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff met the pre-
vailing party standard established in Hensley. 17 The court empha-
sized the Hensley Court's description of the standard as generous' 8
and the Court's statement that meeting the standard only brings the
plaintiff " 'across the statutory threshold' of eligibility for a fee
award."1 9
The court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the
plaintiff was not a prevailing party because she did not request in her
pleadings the relief which was granted.20 According to the court, the
important factor in determining who is a prevailing party "is what
relief was awarded on the facts and the law, not what relief was ex-
pressly requested by the pleadings." 2 '
The Fast court emphasized two characteristics of the relief granted
by the district court to support its holding that the plaintiff was a
prevailing party. First, the holding that the plaintiff was deprived of
property without due process of law was "an important vindication
11. Id. at 1032.
12. Id.; Fast v. School Dist. of Ladue, 543 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
13. 728 F.2d at 1032.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 543 F. Supp. at 788.
17. 728 F.2d at 1035. The court stated that the order that the school district
provide a statement explaining the plaintiffs lay-off and a post-termination hearing
constituted both declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 1033.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424). The court stated, "A plaintiff may be a
'prevailing party' and still, because of failure to prevail on other issues, not receive
full compensation for all of the time and expense invested in the case." Id.
20. Id. at 1033.
21. Id. The court found that a request for a post-termination hearing could be
inferred from the pleadings and that a "party is entitled to whatever relief is appro-
priate under the proof, 'even if the party has not demanded such relief in his plead-
ings.'" Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c)).
1985] 1121
3
et al.: Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
of constitutional rights."22 The court stated that courts produce an
important deterrent effect by declaring that public officials have vio-
lated a citizen's constitutional rights.23 Additionally, the specific re-
lief obtained will deter school boards from arbitrarily dismissing
teachers if they know they must later account for their action.24
The second characteristic which the court stressed was that the re-
lief was not limited to the plaintiff.25 After the district court deci-
sion, the school board revised its lay-off procedure to comply with
the decision and applied the procedure retroactively to all laid-off
tenured teachers.2 6 This, according to the Fast court, is one of the
benefits of successful litigation under section 1983.27 The court
stated that "[w]here . . the litigation results in declaratory and in-
junctive relief. . a standard of conduct is laid down for public offi-
cials, a standard which will in the future benefit all persons in a
situation similar to the plaintiff's."28 Thus, the plaintiff was a pre-
vailing party.29
Six of the Eighth Circuit judges did not fully agree with the major-
ity's opinion. Three justices concurred with the decision but ex-
pressed concern over the "potential for abuse of the public purse
through fee awards under section 1988."30 Three dissenting judges
concluded that the majority was "overly generous" in applying the
Hensley standard.31
In Paragould Music Co. v. City of Paragould,3 2 owners of a video
arcade brought a section 1983 action against city officials and
agents."S The plaintiffs alleged that patrons of the arcade were be-
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1033-34.
25. Id. at 1034.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court cited two panel decisions to support its holding. Id. (citing
Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), Pollock v. Baxter Manor
Nursing Home, 716 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), modifying 706 F.2d 236
(8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)).
30. Id. (Bright, J., concurring). Judge Bright was joined by Judges Ross and
Fagg. According to Judge Bright, both public bodies and plaintiffs are obligated to
proceed in good faith to avoid unnecessary costs to taxpayers. Id. at 1035-36.
31. Id. at 1036 (Henley, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that "awarding attor-
ney's fees in cases in which plaintiffs won nothing of consequence and nothing the
plaintiff wanted . . . can be harshly punitive for defendants who have won on every
important issue chosen for litigation. It tends to trivialize the constitution and
§ 1983 by making them a program for lawyer's relief." Id. at 1037.
32. 738 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1984).
33. Id. at 974.
1122 (Vol. I11
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ing harassed, illegally arrested, and illegally detained.34 The lower
court issued a temporary restraining order.35 During the extension
of this order, the arcade went out of business.36 Subsequently, the
court dismissed the case as moot.3 7 The owners then requested at-
torney's fees for their success in obtaining the restraining order.38
The district court denied the request.3 9
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that merely granting a tem-
porary restraining order did not make the plaintiffs prevailing parties
to be awarded attorney's fees after the case was dismissed as moot.
4 0
The court reasoned that the temporary restraining order neither in-
volved a determination of the merits of the underlying action nor
acted as a catalyst to obtain concessions; 41 the order merely pre-
served the status quo.42 According to the Eighth Circuit, in order to
award attorney's fees, the court must favorably determine a signifi-
cant issue on its merits.43
II. REASONABLE ATrORNEY'S FEES
If a court determines that a plaintiff is a prevailing party, it must
then determine the amount of reasonable attorney's fees to award.44
34. Id. Nearby merchants and citizens had apparently complained that the young
patrons of the arcade were disturbing the peace. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 975.
41. Id. A modification of the catalyst theory was used by the Eighth Circuit to
award attorney's fees prior to passage of the 1976 Attorney's Fees Act. Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970). Under the catalyst
theory, a plaintiff was a prevailing party if his or her lawsuit motivated the defendant
to voluntarily grant the requested relief. See, e.g., id.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st
Cir. 1978) set forth a two-step test for the catalyst theory. The first step, a factual
test, considered the timing of events, the catalytic effect of the plaintiff's suit, and the
need to encourage injured parties to litigate in order to enforce their civil rights. Id
at 280-81. The second step was a legal test which had to be met regardless of
whether the court had determined the defendant's liability. Under this test, "[i]f it
has been judicially determined that defendant's conduct, however beneficial it may
be to plaintiffs' interests, is not required by law, then defendants must be held to
have acted gratuitously and plaintiffs have not prevailed in a legal sense." Id. at 281.
42. 738 F.2d at 975.
43. Id. (citing Reel v. Arkansas Dept. of Corrections, 672 F.2d 693, 697 (8th Cir.
1982)); see also Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 913
(1980) (per curiam) (a party must prevail on the merits of at least some of the claims
before attorney's fees will be awarded); ACORN v. Wallis, 717 F.2d 451, 453 (8th
Cir. 1983).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Section 1988 states that "the court, in its discretion, may
1985] 1123
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In Fast v. School District of City of Ladue,45 the Eighth Circuit remanded
the issue of attorney's fees to the district court.46 The court did,
however, discuss considerations in determining a reasonable
amount. The Fast court stated that the plaintiff's failure on some is-
sues is "directly relevant on the question of the amount of the fee
award."47 The court suggested that the district court multiply the
number of hours spent on the issues upon which the plaintiff pre-
vailed by an hourly rate which the court determines to be
appropriate.48
In Craik v. Minnesota State University Board,49 the Eighth Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of the reasonableness of the hours expended by
plaintiffs' attorneys. The defendants claimed that the number of
hours were unreasonable, citing the fact that their attorneys had
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." Id.
There are two general approaches to computing attorney's fee awards. The first,
commonly known as the lodestar method, was stated in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) [herein-
after cited as Lindy I]. This decision rejected the percentage of recovery system. See
id. at 166-67. In its place the court held that a reasonable fee is determined by multi-
plying the number of hours worked by a reasonable billing rate. Id. at 167. This
lodestar amount is adjusted for risk or contingency and quality factors as specified in
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d
102 (3d Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Lindy II]. The lodestar method was adopted
by the Eighth Circuit injorstad v. IDS Realty Trust, 643 F.2d 1305, 1312-14 (8th Cir.
1981). The second approach is that stated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). This twelve factor method is discussed at
note 57, infta.
A hybrid analysis incorporating the lodestar and Johnson methods was adopted by
the Eighth Circuit in Robinson v. Moreland, 655 F.2d 887 (8th Cir. 1981). The lead-
ing Eighth Circuit case on the issue of reasonable attorney's fees is Jaquette v. Black
Hawk County, Iowa, 710 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1983). In that case the court reiterated
the applicability of the "lodestar-Johnson" standard. Id. at 459. In Hensley v. Eck-
erhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court adopted the "lodestar-Johnson" stan-
dard, focusing on the extent of the plaintiff's success. Id. at 424-36. The Jaquette
court also discussed various sanctions, such as assessing attorney's fees against par-
ties found responsible for abusive litigation practices. 710 F.2d at 462-64. The court
suggested that rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be used to avoid
excessive costs and delay. Id. at 463; see also Rajender v. University of Minn., 546 F.
Supp. 158, 163-69 (D. Minn. 1982) (historical discussion of attorney's fees in the
Eighth Circuit).
45. 728 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1984). For a discussion of the court's decision that
the plaintiff in Fast was a prevailing party, see supra notes 10-31 and accompanying
text.
46. 728 F.2d at 1035.
47. Id. (dictum). The court noted that the plaintiff failed on her requests for
reinstatement, "which was probably what she wanted most out of her suit." Id.
48. Id.
49. 738 F.2d 348 (8th Cir. 1984). The plaintiffs were prevailing parties on ap-
peal and thus were entitled to an award of fees and costs under § 1988. Id. at 349.
1124 [Vol. I11
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spent considerably less time on the appeal.50 The Craik court con-
ceded that the time spent by a defendant's attorney is a relevant fac-
tor 5 1 but found that the disparity in hours spent by the parties'
attorneys in the case was not great enough to cast doubt upon the
reasonableness of the hours spent by the plaintiffs' attorneys.
52
The court also rejected the defendants' claims that fees paid to
out-of-state counsel and compensation for travel time were unrea-
sonable. The court held that a plaintiff is not prohibited from seek-
ing fees for out-of-state counsel, particularly when the hourly fee
closely matched fees charged by in-state counsel.5" Holding that
compensation for travel time was reasonable, the court stated that
civil rights counsel should be "no worse off" than attorneys who
charge an hourly rate and who customarily charge for travel time.54
The Craik court then addressed the issue of whether the attorney's
fee award should be reduced to reflect the less than completely suc-
cessful results obtained.55 The defendants cited Hensley v. Eckerhart56
which stated, "The congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing
parties requires that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had
been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be
awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim."5 7 The Craik court
50. Id. Defendants' attorneys spent 790.4 hours on the appeal while the plain-
tiffs' attorneys spent 1,203.7 hours. Id.
51. Id. (citing Doulin v. White, 549 F. Supp. 152, 159 (E.D. Ark. 1982)).
52. Id.
53. Id. The court held that Craik was unlike Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson,
689 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1982) (en banc). The Avalon court reduced a California law-
yer's hourly fee of $170 to the local Arkansas rate, refuting his claim that "no counsel
competent and experienced in this area of the law were available in the Little Rock
area." Id. at 141. In Craik, the Arkansas counsel claimed an hourly rate of only five
dollars more than that claimed by defendants' counsel. Craik, 738 F.2d at 349.
54. Craik, 738 F.2d at 350.
55. Id.
56. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
57. Id. at 435 (footnote omitted). The Hensley Court stated that the results ob-
tained are an important factor in adjusting the fee upward or downward. See id. at
434-35. But see Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1541-42 (1984) (results obtained
usually not grounds for fee enhancement). The Court in Hensley approved using a
twelve factor test to determine § 1988 fee awards. See 461 U.S. at 429-30. This test
was initially set forth in Johnson as being consistent with the American Bar Associa-
tion's Model Code of Professional Responsibility, EC2-18 & DR2-106. See id. at 430
& n.3 (citingJohnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19). The twelve factors are:
(1) the time and labor required;
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the
case;
(5) the customary fee;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained;
1985] 1125
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emphasized that a reduction could not be made with mathematical
certainty and that "all issues are not of equal importance, legal or
factual."5 8 The court concluded that a twenty percent reduction was
appropriate.59
Finally, the court addressed the issue of enhancement of attorney's
fees. 60 The court, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Blum v.
Stenson,6 t stated that the results obtained are not usually proper
grounds for enhancement62 but that the risks assumed in taking the
case could be proper grounds.63 The Craik court concluded that,
given the extensive amount of time spent by two of plaintiffs' attor-
neys with no hope of compensation if the appeal was unsuccessful,
their fees should be enhanced by twenty-five percent. 64
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTION 1988 AND OTHER
FEDERAL LAW
In Rose v. State of Nebraska,65 the plaintiff brought suit on behalf of
his handicapped child.66 The principal issue was the validity of a Ne-
braska administrative procedure for appealing placement decisions
made by school officials for handicapped children.67 The procedure
gave the State Comissioner of Education the authority to review a
hearing officer's conclusions on administrative appeals filed by dis-
satisfied parents.6 8 The plaintiff argued that the statute granting this
power of review conflicted with the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (EAHCA).69 Under the EAHCA, a decision made by an
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
(10) the "undesirability" of the case;
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
and
(12) awards in similar cases.
Id. at 430 n.3 (citingJohnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19).
58. 738 F.2d at 350.
59. Id. The court conceded that the use of percentages may be somewhat arbi-
trary and give "a delusive appearance of exactness." Id. at 351.
60. Id. at 350.
61. 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
62. Craik, 738 F.2d at 350 (citing Blum, 104 S. Ct. at 1548).
63. Id. (citing Blum, 104 S. Ct. at 1550 & n.17) ("Blum leaves open the possibility
that the risks assumed by counsel in taking a case can be a ground for
enhancement").
64. Id. at 350-51. The court found that the amount of time spent by the plain-
tiffs' other two attorneys was "not sufficiently great to represent any significant risk."
Id. at 351.
65. 748 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1984).
66. Id. at 1260.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61 (1982); 748 F.2d at 1260.
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impartial hearing officer is final.70 The plaintiff argued that the en-
trance of the Commissioner "into the hearing process destroyed the
impartiality of the proceeding, in violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."71 This constitutional claim was the
basis for the section 1983 action.72
The court considered whether attorney's fees should be awarded
for state administrative hearings since the EAHCA requires exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies.73 The court rejected this claim, stat-
ing that the fee award claim is not based on the EAHCA.74 Rather,
the claim was based on a due process claim under section 1983,
which does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies.75
Therefore, fees paid related to the administrative proceedings were
not recoverable.
The court next addressed a cross appeal by the State of Nebraska.
The state claimed that the eleventh amendment barred the plaintiff's
suit and the award of attorney's fees against the state.76 The court
agreed, quoting the Supreme Court's recent holding in Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman.'77 "[I]n the absence of consent a
suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.
This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief
sought."78
Finally, the Rose court addressed a cross-appeal by defendants,
other than the state, who also claimed protection under the ele,'h
70. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1).
71. 748 F.2d at 1260.
72. Id. The district court originally granted relief to the plaintiff. Monahan v.
Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1095 (D. Neb. 1980), afd in part and vacated in part, 645
F.2d 592 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1981). The Eighth Circuit affirmed,
but remanded for modification of the type of relief. Monahan, 645 F.2d 592. In the
meantime, the offending state law was amended, rendering the claim moot. See Rose,
748 F.2d at 1260. On the second appeal, the court held that the plaintiff's claim for
attorney's fees was not moot since the plaintiff had prevailed in the district court and
on the first appeal. Id. The court reasoned that although the EAHCA contained no
provision for attorney's fees, the fact that the complaint stated a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, even though not reached by the court, entitled the plaintiff to a fee
award. Id. at 1260-61. The court stated:
Where a non-fee claim is joined with a non-frivolous claim under a statute
providing for the award of fees, and the plaintiff prevails with respect to his
non-fee claim, thus making it unnecessary for the court to reach the § 1983
claim, an award of fees is nevertheless appropriate.
Id. at 1261 (quoting Monahan, 687 F.2d at 1172).
73. Rose, 748 F.2d at 1261.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1261-62.
76. Id. at 1262.
77. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
78. 748 F.2d at 1262 (quoting Halderman, 104 S. Ct. at 908 (citations omitted)).
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amendment. 79 The court rejected the argument, holding that "suits
for declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials are not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment." 80 The Rose court reasoned
that although state officials may have qualified immunity against
damages claims, that immunity was irrelevant here since all damages
claims had been dismissed and only the equitable fee award claim
remained.81 The court also rejected the defendants' contention that
the court should bar the award of attorney's fees, because state funds
must be used to pay them.8 2
The defendants also claimed that the fee award was barred by the
exclusivity doctrine.83 The defendants argued that the EAHCA,
which did not provide for attorney's fees, provided the exclusive
remedy for the plaintiff's claim.8 4 The Rose court rejected this argu-
ment, citing Smith v. Robinson.85 In Smith, the Supreme Court held
that the EAHCA provided the "exclusive avenue through which a
plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim to a publically financed
special education." 86 The Rose court interpreted Smith to strongly
suggest that an independent due process claim was available.8 7 The
court, quoting the Smith Court, stated, "[U]nlike an independent
equal protection claim, maintenance of an independent due process
challenge to state procedures would not be inconsistent with the
[EAHCA's] comprehensive scheme." 88 Thus, the court concluded
that a fee award was appropriate because the plaintiff claimed that, in
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
79. Id. These defendants were the State Board of Education, the Governor, the
Commissioner of Education, members of the State Board of Education, the Douglas
County School District No. 1, and employees of the School District. Id.
80. Id. (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) as dispositive).
81. Id. (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315 n.6, reh. denied, 421 U.S. 921
(1975), and Edman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677, reh. denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974)).
But cf Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (title VII back pay award against a
state not barred by sovereign immunity).
82. 748 F.2d at 1262. This fiscal concern is unpersuasive even where the award
is against an official with absolute immunity. Id. (citing Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct.
1970 (1984)).
83. Id. at 1263 (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981)). Accord-
ing to the exclusivity doctrine, "when a statute creates a comprehensive remedial
scheme, intentional 'omissions' from that scheme should not be supplanted by the
remedial apparatus of§ 1983." Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457, 3465 (1984). In
Thiboutot, the Court held that attorney's fees are available under § 1988 for violations
of § 1983. Sea Clammers excluded from the reach of Thiboutot cases in which Congress
specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983. 453 U.S. at 19-21.
84. 748 F.2d at 1263.
85. 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984); see 748 F.2d at 1263.
86. 104 S. Ct. at 3468.
87. 748 F.2d at 1263.
88. Id.
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EAHCA administrative hearing was not impartially conducted.89
This independent due process challenge warranted an attorney's fee
award even though the same theory was the basis for a claim under
the EAHCA.90
89. Id.
90. Id. The Rose court affirmed the district court's reduction of the fee award due
to the degree of success obtained by the plaintiff. Id. at 1264. The court also held
that fees could not be awarded against the Governor or the local school district. Id.
The court found that fee awards against other parties more directly involved in the
actions giving rise to the plaintiff's claim would provide full compensation. Id.
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